Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 91
Issue 2 Causation, Liability and Apportionment:
Comparative Interdisciplinary Perspectives

Article 14

5-16-2016

Protecting Public Employee Trial Testimony
Joseph Deloney
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Evidence Commons, First
Amendment Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph Deloney, Protecting Public Employee Trial Testimony, 91 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 709 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol91/iss2/14

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 141 Side A

05/10/2016 13:13:34

13 DELONEY FINAL DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

4/14/2016 8:19 PM

PROTECTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE TRIAL TESTIMONY
JOSEPH DELONEY *

INTRODUCTION
In a number of jurisdictions, public employees can be deprived of
First Amendment protection and placed in a seemingly impossible situation. 1 This situation could potentially force persons to lie under oath and
thus commit perjury in order to satisfy their State employer’s wishes, or tell
the truth and risk retaliation at the hands of their State employer.
For public employee speech to receive First Amendment coverage,2
the employee’s speech must have been made as a “citizen upon matters of
public concern.” 3 The Supreme Court, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, held that
when a person speaks “pursuant to official duties,” that person is not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, but rather as an employee. 4
Thus, the Court concluded that “the First Amendment does not prohibit
managerial discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant
to official responsibilities.” 5
Without a comprehensive framework for determining when an employee had spoken “pursuant to official duties,” lower courts were left to
struggle with the question. 6 Lower courts particularly differed in applying
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thoughtful comments and editing contributions.
1. Matt Wolfe, Does the First Amendment Protect Testimony by Public Employees?, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1473, 1490 (2010).
2. Throughout the article, I distinguish First Amendment “coverage” from “protection.” “Coverage” means that the speech at issue is covered under First Amendment because it meets the criteria of
“citizen speech on matters of public concern.” E.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (2014)
(citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
In contrast, “protection” means that after conducting a Pickering analysis, the employee’s First
Amendment interest outweighs the government’s interest in managerial control. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at
2380–81. Therefore, the speech is protected by the First Amendment.
3. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
4. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
5. Id. at 424.
6. See Keane A. Barger, Note, Be a Liar or You’re Fired! First Amendment Protection for
Public Employees Who Object to Their Employer’s Criminal Demands, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1553–
55 (2013) (examining the different factors and tests used by lower courts in the wake of Garcetti to
determine whether an employee’s speech was made pursuant to official duties). The Court in Garcetti
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Garcetti to situations in which a public employee provided sworn, truthful,
trial testimony both pursuant to and outside of his or her job responsibilities. 7 The difficulty in assessing such cases led to questionable results. 8 For
example, in Deprado v. City of Miami, a police officer alleged that he faced
adverse employment actions after testifying before a grand jury about police misconduct, specifically that a member of the SWAT team had planted
evidence in a shooting incident.9 The district court found that the First
Amendment did not protect the officer’s trial testimony, because the police
officer spoke pursuant to his official duties. 10
In order to resolve some of the discord among lower courts, the Supreme Court took up Lane v. Franks. 11 In Lane, the Court affirmatively
answered the “discrete question” 12 of whether the First Amendment protects a public employee who provides truthful sworn testimony outside of
their “ordinary jobs responsibilities” 13 from adverse employment conse-

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 141 Side B
05/10/2016 13:13:34

declined to adopt a comprehensive framework for determining whether speech was made pursuant to
official duties and instead suggested that the inquiry was a practical one. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
7. See Adelaida Jasperse, Note, Constitutional Law—Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t:
A Public Employee’s Trilemma Regarding Truthful Testimony, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 623, 641–44
(discussing the post-Garcetti circuit split regarding whether First Amendment protections should be
extended to an employee who provides truthful sworn testimony pursuant to his or her official duties).
8. See Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled by Dahlia v.
Rodriguez, 735 F.3d. 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013). Although later overruled, the Ninth Circuit in Huppert
held that the First Amendment did not protect a police officer’s trial testimony regarding corruption
among his fellow officers because the officer testified pursuant to his official duties. Huppert, 574 F.3d
at 706; see also Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App’x. 883, 884 (11th Cir. 2007). In Green, the chief jailer at
the county jail testified at a hearing before the county superior court regarding whether a convicted
murderer currently housed at the jail should be moved to a maximum-security prison. Id. at 884. At the
hearing, the jailer testified that many of the cell door locks were broken and that she did not think the
jail was suitable to house the prisoner in question. Id. The guard was fired for her testimony. Id. The
court held that because the speech was made pursuant to official duties, her First Amendment rights
were not violated. Id.
9. Deprado v. City of Miami, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d, 246 F. App’x.
769 (11th Cir. 2008).
10. Id. at 1346.
11. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 (2014). The Court in Lane explained it “granted certiorari to resolve discord among the Courts of Appeals as to whether employees may be fired—or suffer
other adverse employment consequences—for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the
course of their ordinary job responsibilities.” Id. The Court then cited to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
in Lane v. Franks (the decision being appealed to the Court) and the Third Circuit’s decision in Reilly v.
City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008). Id. The Court’s decision to cite to Reilly is somewhat
curious because in that case the Third Circuit expressed that it was analyzing the plaintiff’s claim as if
he had testified pursuant to official duties: “Reilly, as an Atlantic City police officer, assisted a state
investigation of a fellow officer and testified for the prosecution at the subsequent trial. Thus, the
speech at issue on this appeal, Reilly’s trial testimony, appears to have stemmed from his official duties
in the investigation.” Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231. For further discussion, see infra Part II.
12. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring).
13. This was a shift from Garcetti’s language of “pursuant to official duties.” Compare Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding the First Amendment does not protect speech by public
employees made “pursuant to their official duties”) (emphasis added), with Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378
(holding the First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech made “outside the scope of his
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ordinary job responsibilities”) (emphasis added). The Court seemed to refine its conception of Garcetti
and unequivocally reject the broad interpretation adopted by the Eleventh Circuit. See infra Section I.D.
14. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.
15. Id. at 2378 n.4 (“We . . . need not address in this case whether sworn testimony would constitute citizen speech under Garcetti when given as part of a public employee’s ordinary job duties, and
express no opinion on the matter today.”).
16. See Brief for Am. Civil Liberties Union & the Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ala. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2377 (2014) (No. 13–483), 2014 WL
950813 [hereinafter ACLU Brief] (“In fact, if anything, the public has an especially strong interest in
according protection to witnesses who regularly testify on behalf of the government. Juries give great
weight to the testimony of such witnesses, yet the witnesses are at the same time at unique risk of
reprisal for giving truthful testimony that is adverse to the government’s interests.”).
17. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
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quences. 14 In its opinion, the Court emphasized the limited nature of its
holding, and specifically declined to answer whether the First Amendment
protected a public employee that provides truthful, subpoenaed testimony
during the course of his or her ordinary job duties. 15
Despite the Court’s correct holding in Lane, public employees that testify as part of their ordinary job responsibilities remain without First
Amendment safeguards. This is troubling. The integrity of the judicial system depends on its ability to sort fact from fiction. This vital, if not primary, function of the judicial system is undermined when a person faces
external pressures that could potentially cause them to give false or misleading testimony. Moreover, the public employees that are most vulnerable under the Court’s current doctrine are persons whose testimony the
judicial system absolutely depends on for accurate and truthful statements. 16 For example, police officers, state and federal regulators, and forensic analysts that regularly testify during grand jury proceedings and
trials remain unprotected simply because these employees testify as part of
their ordinary job duties. And although the government must be able to
regulate the conduct of its employees and retain control over employee
behavior, the employee’s interest as a citizen cannot be ignored.
Every citizen—irrespective of employment status—bears the obligation to provide truthful testimony whenever he or she takes the stand. This
is a legal duty and one not easily escaped. 17 Because of this duty, it is necessary to recognize the concurrent roles the employee occupies when testifying before an adjudicatory body: government employee and citizen. Once
these dual roles are acknowledged, it becomes clear that from time to time
an individual’s interest as a government employee and interest as a citizen
will be diametrically opposed to one another. On the one hand, employees
will be legally obligated to tell the truth when testifying, even if damaging
to their employer. On the other hand, if employees provide such testimony,
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18. In Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75
(1968), the Court articulated the foundational test for determining whether the First Amendment prohibited a government employer from taking adverse employment action against an employee based on the
employee’s speech. For further discussion, see infra Part I.A.
19. Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013).
20. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008).
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then they can potentially face adverse employment action, such as termination.
Therefore, in order to accommodate these competing interests while
still allowing the government to exert managerial control over its employees, Garcetti’s complete bar to First Amendment claims based on speech
made in the course of an employee’s ordinary job duties should not apply
to testimonial speech—speech made before a grand jury, at criminal or
civil trials, or when under oath during a judicial proceeding.
This Note proposes a rule that provides for an exception to Garcetti
when the speech at issue is trial or grand jury testimony and adopts an approach that would classify compelled or voluntary testimonial speech, in a
criminal or civil context, as per se “citizen speech” speaking to a “matter of
public concern.” From there, courts would apply the typical balancing test
the Supreme Court articulated in Pickering v. Board of Education, discussed infra, to determine whether a public employee’s First Amendment
free speech rights were unconstitutionally infringed upon. 18 Furthermore,
this Note will argue that, in light of Lane, that such a rule would strike the
proper balance between the competing interest of the State and the employee, and provide a workable framework for courts to analyze these types of
cases.
To that end, in Part I, this Note will examine several of the Supreme
Court’s leading decisions regarding First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech in the public employee context. Drawing from the cases discussed
in Part I, Part II will synthesize the Court’s guiding principles for analyzing
First Amendment claims in the public employee context. Part III will examine the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Chrzanowski v. Bianchi 19 and the
Third Circuit’s decision in Reilly v. City of Atlantic City. 20 Utilizing these
cases in conjunction with Lane, this Note will argue that an adoption of this
Note’s proposed rule would sufficiently protect the government’s interest
in maintaining efficiency and control over its employees, while still protecting the employee’s First Amendment interests as a citizen commenting
on a matter of public concern.
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I. FROM PICKERING TO LANE
For many years, public employee First Amendment protections were
severely degraded. 21 As Justice Holmes put it, “[A policeman] may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.” 22 In other words, the individual forfeited rights that, but for the
person’s public employment, ordinarily would be protected by the First
Amendment. This “unchallenged dogma,” 23 however, began to change in
the 1950s and mid-1960s. 24 And in the late 1960s, the prevailing notion of
Justice Holmes’s time—that because of their employment, public employees give up First Amendment protections—finally came to a head, and was
put to rest in the Court’s leading decision concerning modern freedom of
speech protections in the public employee context—Pickering v. Board of
Education. 25
A. Pickering v. Board of Education

05/10/2016 13:13:34

21. See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952).
22. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892), abrogated by O’Hare Truck
Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
23. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967).
25. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75
(1968).
26. Id. at 564–65.
27. Id. at 566.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 567–68.
31. Id. at 565.
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In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Pickering v. Board of Education,
one of its seminal cases regarding public employees’ First Amendment
rights to freedom of expression. At issue in Pickering was whether a teacher’s letter to the editor published in a local newspaper was protected First
Amendment speech.26 In the letter, Marvin Pickering, a public school
teacher, criticized the local Board of Education for a proposed sale of district bonds in order to finance new athletic facilities at the high school.27
The letter also personally criticized the district’s superintendent. 28 Upset
with Pickering’s letter, the Board fired Pickering. 29 Pickering eventually
appealed his dismissal to the Illinois Supreme Court, which rejected his
claim. 30 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, finding that
Pickering’s First Amendment rights had been violated. 31
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Id. at 568.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Id. at 569–70.
Id.
Id. at 570–71.
Id.
Id. at 574.

05/10/2016 13:13:34

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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In its decision, the Court first reaffirmed the principle that public employees’ constitutional rights may not be subjected to unreasonable restrictions or conditions as part of their employment or as a requisite of
employment. 32 But the Court also noted that the “State has interests as an
employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general.” 33 Thus the Court concluded that, the central issue in
cases concerning public employee First Amendment speech is to “arrive at
a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.” 34
The Court began its balancing test by initially distinguishing between
the true and false statements contained in the letter. 35 Regarding the statements that could be taken as true, the Court unequivocally rejected that
those statements provided a basis for Pickering’s dismissal. 36 The Court
reasoned that these statements in no way disrupted the efficiency of the
school or its proper function because the statements were aimed at the
Board and the school superintendent, none of whom worked directly with
Pickering. 37 As such, the Board could not adequately show that the statements were so disruptive that they provided a basis for Pickering’s dismissal. 38
As for the statements considered false, the Court found those too were
protected. 39 The Court determined that the Board had shown neither any
evidence suggesting there was actual reputational harm to the Board nor a
resultant controversy or conflict among the Board, teachers, administrators,
or residents of the district. 40 And Pickering’s false statements were not
made recklessly or knowingly. 41 Consequently, the Board only had a minimal interest in limiting Pickering’s contribution to public discourse as a
citizen.
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Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id. at 574–75.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 572.

05/10/2016 13:13:34

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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The Court then assessed Pickering’s interests that were implicated
when he wrote the letter. Critical to the Court’s analysis was the fact that
Pickering was speaking on a matter of “public concern” in his letter. The
public concern the Court identified was “whether a school system required
additional funds.” 42 Considering the nature of the “public concern,” the
Court determined that “[t]eachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds
allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent.” 43 The Court concluded that, “it is essential” that teachers be able to comment on such matters “without fear of retalia[tion]” from their employer. 44 As such,
Pickering had a significant interest in commenting on a matter of public
concern when he wrote his letter to the newspaper.
Because Pickering had a significant interest in commenting on school
funding and the government could show little to no institutional disruption,
the Court struck the balance in Pickering’s favor. Accordingly, the Court
held that the Board did indeed violate Pickering’s First Amendment rights
when it fired him for expressing his dissatisfaction in his letter to the editor. 45
The Court’s opinion in Pickering is significant because it laid the
foundational framework for analyzing First Amendment freedom of speech
issues in the context of public employment. The Pickering balancing test
weighs the employee’s interests as a citizen commenting on a matter of
public concern with the state’s interests as an employer in promoting efficiency. 46 However, in laying out this template by which to analyze these
types of claims, the Court did not provide exact tests or definitions for lower courts to follow in analyzing what constitutes “matters of public concern” or “citizen” speech. Moreover, in reaching its conclusion, the Court’s
reasoning seemed driven by the fact that Pickering was commenting on a
matter of public interest. Although the Court did characterize the case as
one about a “teacher [making] erroneous public statements upon issues
then currently of public attention,” there was little attention focused on
whether Pickering was commenting as a citizen or employee. 47
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B. Connick v. Meyers

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Id. at 140.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 143.

05/10/2016 13:13:34

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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The Court, in Connick v. Myers, 48 attempted to clarify some of the
ambiguity left in the wake of Pickering. In Connick, the Court was asked to
determine whether the First Amendment prohibited a State employee from
being terminated over a survey circulated around her office concerning
internal office affairs. 49 The Court held that it did not. 50
Shelia Myers was an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans
working in the criminal division. 51 After five years, Myers was informed
that she was going to be transferred to a different division of criminal
court. 52 Myers objected to the transfer and expressed her concerns to her
supervisors and peers.53 Additionally, Myers drafted and distributed a questionnaire to her fellow employees. 54 In the survey, she solicited their opinions regarding the office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a
grievance committee, the level of confidence they had in supervisors, and
whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns. 55 Myers’
immediate supervisor learned of the questionnaire and informed District
Attorney, Harry Connick, that Myers was attempting a “miniinsurrection.” 56 As a result of circulating the survey, Myers was fired. 57
Myers brought suit alleging she was fired for exercising her First
Amendment rights in distributing the questionnaire. 58 The Court began
analyzing Myers’ claim by reiterating the central tenant of Pickering: the
Court must attempt to find “a balance between the interest of the [employee], as a citizen . . . [and] as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.” 59 The Court then proceeded to point out that the district court misunderstood Pickering’s requirement that the employee speak “as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern.” 60 After recounting cases in which employee
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61. The Court noted it had protected employee speech in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598
(1972) (protecting a college professor’s speech before a state legislature) and Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (holding that a teacher’s memorandum given to a
local radio station, which in turn reported the contents of the memo as a news item was protected
speech). Moreover, the Court observed that in, Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410,
415–16 (1979), “[a]lthough the subject-matter of the [employee’s] statements were not the issue before
the Court, it is clear that her statements concerning the school district’s allegedly racially discriminatory
policies involved a matter of public concern.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 147–48.
65. Id. at 146.
66. Id. at 148 n.7.
67. Id. at 149.
68. Id. at 148.
69. Id.
70. Id.

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 145 Side A

speech had been characterized as a “matter[] of public concern,” 61 the
Court came to the conclusion “that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern,” then
there would be no reason to inquire into the reasons for her termination. 62
In other words, whether the employee spoke on a matter of public concern
is a threshold question that must be addressed before proceeding to the
Pickering balancing test.
Accordingly, the Court held that when a public employee speaks not
as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but rather as employee upon
matters of personal interest, the courts are not the proper place to review a
personnel decision taken by an agency. 63 To determine whether the employee speech touches on a matter of public concern, the Court instructed
that the speech be analyzed by accounting for its “content, form, and context . . . as revealed by the whole record.” 64 Further, it also suggested that a
“public concern” was “any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community.” 65 Lastly, the Court noted that the question of whether the
employee’s speech met the threshold inquiry of public concern is one of
law, not fact. 66
Applying those principles, the Court found that only one portion of
Myers’ questionnaire—the portion asking whether employees felt pressure
to join political campaigns—touched on a matter of public concern.67 As
for the other questions within the survey, the Court held that those did not
meet the “public concern” threshold.68 Rather, these questions were “mere
extensions” of Myers’ personal displeasure of being transferred. 69 Myers’
questions did not expose that the District Attorney’s office was failing to
discharge its duties or defying the public confidence. 70 Thus, the district
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71. Id. at 149.
72. Id. at 154.
73. Id. at 150.
74. Id. at 150–51 (internal citations omitted).
75. Id. at 151.
76. Id. at 152–53. In Rankin v. McPherson, the Court reaffirmed that in performing the Pickering
balancing test, “the statement will not be considered in a vacuum; the manner, time, and place of the
employee’s expression are relevant, as is the context in which the dispute arose.” Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
77. Connick, 461 U.S. at 153.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 154.
81. Id. The Court in City of San Diego v. Roe subsequently explained that the concern of government operations being compromised if all employee speech was subject to a Pickering analysis
“prompted the Court in Connick to explain the threshold [public concern] inquiry (implicit in Pickering
itself).” City of San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521, 525 (2004).
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court erred in determining that as a whole the questionnaire touched on a
matter of public concern. The Court also expressed concern that government efficiency would be compromised if every employee complaint had
the potential to evolve into a constitutional claim. 71
Despite the fact that the questionnaire did minutely touch on a matter
of public concern, the Court found that under the Pickering balancing test
Connick was justified in terminating Myers. 72 First, the Court in clear
terms noted that the government’s burden, for proving that the termination
of the employee was justified, varied with the nature of employee’s
speech. 73 The Court then identified the government’s legitimate purpose as
“promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties,
and . . . maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public service.” 74 From there,
the Court noted the need for good working relationships in the District
Attorney’s office, and concluded that Myers’ questionnaire undermined the
government’s legitimate interests.75 The time, place, and manner in which
Myers delivered the questionnaire weighed against her, because the process
by which Myers’ presented her concerns and questionnaire to her fellow
employees detracted from office efficiency. 76 Finally, the context in which
the dispute arose also weighed in favor of the government. 77 Myers circulated the survey questioning the very policy being applied to her, which
further undermined her claim. 78 As such, the Court found that “weight must
be given to the supervisor’s view that the employee has threatened the authority of the employer to run the office.” 79 Thus, Myers’ First Amendment
rights were not violated. 80
Connick made explicit what was already somewhat apparent 81 from
Pickering: 82 For a court to entertain a public employee’s First Amendment
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claim, the employee must have been speaking as a citizen commenting on a
matter of public concern. 83 If that condition is not met, then the employee’s
claim must fail, and there is no need to balance the competing interests of
the government and the employee under Pickering. 84 In addition, the Court
reiterated the need to weigh the employee’s interests and the State interest
in relation to the speech at issue, emphasizing that the State’s burden for
justifying its action depends on the nature of the speech at issue. 85 Further,
the Court provided some guideposts for determining what touched on a
matter of public concern and how to weigh the employee and State’s competing interests. 86
C. Garcetti v. Ceballos
Over twenty years later, the Court, in a controversial decision, revisited the issues surrounding public employee First Amendment claims in
Garcetti v. Ceballos. 87 In Garcetti, a Deputy District Attorney, Richard
Ceballos, was informed that an affidavit used as the basis for a search warrant contained serious misrepresentations. 88 After learning of this information, Ceballos investigated the affidavit for himself and concluded the
same. 89 Ceballos brought this to the attention of his supervisors and prepared a memorandum recommending dismissal of the case based on this
information. 90 After a meeting between Ceballos, his supervisors, and the
officer that provided the affidavit, Ceballos’ supervisors decided to proceed
with the prosecution of the case. 91 Ceballos eventually was called as a witness by the defense during a motion to traverse, in which he expressed his
observations concerning the affidavit. 92
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 146 Side A
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82. Roe also clarified what the Court thought constituted “public concern.” In Roe, a police
officer was discharged for producing pornographic material in which he appeared in his police uniform.
Id. at 522. The Court stated “that public concern is something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication.” Id. Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that Roe’s speech clearly did not touch on a matter
of public concern. Id. at 526. Therefore, the First Amendment did not cover the officer’s video. Id.
Consequently, there was no need for the district court to apply Pickering’s balancing test. Id.
83. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
84. Id. at 143, 146.
85. Id. at 150.
86. See id.
87. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006); Jessica Reed, From Pickering to Ceballos:
The Demise of the Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 95, 108 (2007).
88. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413–14.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 414.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 414–15.
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93. Id. at 415.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 417.
96. Id. at 418.
97. Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 418–19.
102. Id. at 419.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Ceballos alleged that in the wake of this incident he suffered adverse
employment actions such as being transferred and passed up for promotion. 93 Ceballos eventually filed suit in federal district court. He argued that
his employer violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him
based on the memorandum recommending dismissal of the case. 94 Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that Ceballos’ memorandum
was not protected speech. 95
Citing Pickering and Connick, the Court presented a two-part test used
to determine whether a public employee’s speech was constitutionally protected. 96 First, it must be determined “whether the employee spoke as a
citizen on a matter of public concern. . . . If the answer is no, the employee
does not have a First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.” 97 But, if the employee has spoken as a
citizen on a matter of public concern, then a potential “First Amendment
claim arises.” 98 The government then must have “an adequate justification
for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general
public.” 99
The Court then went on to explain that individuals who enter pubic
service necessarily give up some liberties enjoyed by citizens that are not
employees of the government. 100 This is so because the government, as an
employer, needs to exert a certain amount of control over its employees in
order to maintain efficiency and orderly administration of services. 101 Further, public employees are in “trusted positions in society. When they speak
out, they can express views that contravene governmental policies or impair the proper performance of governmental functions.”102 However, the
Court also acknowledged, “a citizen who works for the government is
nonetheless a citizen.” 103 Further, when an employee speaks as a citizen on
a matter of public concern, “they must face only those speech restrictions
that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.” 104 The Court also noted the societal benefits that flow from public em-
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Id. at 419–20.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 421.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 422.
Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 424.
Id.
Id. at 424–25.
See generally supra note 8.
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105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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ployees being able to speak openly on matters concerning the community. 105
The Court then turned to Ceballos’ memorandum. According to the
Court, the fact that Ceballos drafted his memorandum and voiced his concerns in the office was not dispositive.106 The fact that Ceballos’ memorandum touched on the subject matter of his employment was also
nondispositive. 107 Instead, the case turned on the fact that Ceballos’ “expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.” 108 Ceballos was not acting as a citizen while “conducting his daily professional
activities” which included drafting disposition memorandums. 109 Thus,
“[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties that the employee
might have enjoyed as a private citizen.” 110 Further, the Court explained
that the government had “heightened interests in controlling speech made
by an employee in his or her professional capacity.” 111 Consequently, the
Court held that when an employee speaks pursuant to official duties, the
First Amendment does not prevent the government from taking adverse
employment action against the employee for his or her speech. 112
In reaching its decision, the Court declined to adopt a comprehensive
test to determine whether an employee spoke “pursuant to official duties”
because there was no serious debate that Ceballos indeed made his expression pursuant to his employment duties. 113 The Court instead provided that
the “proper inquiry is a practical one.”114 And, it added that overly broad
job descriptions would not suffice in determining what constituted an employee’s job duties. 115
An ostensibly straightforward rule emerged from Garcetti: Speech
made pursuant to a public employee’s official duties is not protected First
Amendment speech. Without a concrete framework, however, lower courts
have applied the rule in varying ways, which has led to questionable outcomes. 116 Adding a further complication was the Court’s determination that
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the government had a heightened interest when the speech at issue “owes
its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.” Moreover, many commentators that examined Garcetti’s future application in a
wide variety of contexts were critical of the Court’s categorical bar to First
Amendment claims for public employee speech made pursuant to official
duties. 117
D. Lane v. Franks

05/10/2016 13:13:34

117. Outside of public employees that typically testify as part of their ordinary job duties, commentators opined that Garcetti could impinge, for example, on academic freedom in the academic
setting. Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 54,
54 (2008).
118. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2014).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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The Lane v. Franks litigation began in the Middle District of Alabama
in 2011, but the events that precipitated the lawsuit stem back to 2006. 118 In
2006, Edward Lane was hired by Central Alabama Community College
(“CACC”) to be the Director of the Community Intensive Training for
Youth (“CITY”). 119 CITY was a statewide program in Alabama that provided services to underserved youth. 120 Lane was hired on a probationary
basis. 121 As CITY’s director, Lane was responsible for typical managerial
functions, such as hiring and firing employees, overseeing the day-to-day
operations, and making decisions regarding CITY’s finances. 122
Prompted by CITY’s financial difficulties, Lane conducted an extensive audit of the program and its expenses. 123 At the conclusion of his audit,
Lane discovered that Suzanne Schmitz, an Alabama State Representative,
had not been reporting to her post at her local CITY office. 124 Lane attempted to resolve the matter with Representative Schmitz, but his attempts
were ineffective. 125 In response, Lane brought the matter to the attention of
CACC’s president and attorney, who both warned Lane not to fire Representative Schmitz because of potential negative consequences for both him
and CACC. 126
Despite the warning, Lane fired Schmitz. 127 Schmitz’s firing caught
the attention of the FBI, which opened up an investigation into Schmitz’s
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Id.
Id. Schmitz’ first trial resulted in a mistrial. She was tried again and convicted. Id. at 2375
Id. at 2376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2367–77.
Id. at 2377.
Id.
Id. at 2378.
Id.
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130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
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employment with CITY. 128 Schmitz was later indicted, and Lane eventually
testified against Schmitz at a grand jury proceeding and twice at her trial. 129
Steve Franks eventually took over CITY, which continued having financial difficulties. 130 Lane suggested that Franks terminate some employees to shore up the programs’ finances. 131 Franks fired CITY’s
probationary employees. 132 Thereafter, Franks re-hired many of the probationary employees; Lane was not included.133 Franks claimed that he did
not rescind Lane’s termination because of his testimony against Schmitz. 134
Lane eventually sued Franks, alleging that he was discharged because
of his testimony against Schmitz 135—a violation of his First Amendment
rights. 136 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Franks. 137 Relying on Garcetti, the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that Lane had been acting pursuant to his official duties
when he investigated and later testified against Schmitz. 138 The Eleventh
Circuit also erroneously concluded that although Lane testified about his
duties compelled by subpoena in the litigation context, his speech still did
not warrant First Amendment protection. 139
Reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court first reiterated Pickering’s guiding principles: In order to determine which interest
should prevail when the government seeks to curtail its employee’s speech,
the court must balance the interest of the government as an employer in
promoting efficiency and the employee’s interest as a citizen in commenting on a matter of public concern. 140 The Court then recounted Garcetti’s
“pursuant to official job duties” inquiry to determine whether the speech
was made as a citizen on a matter of public concern or as an employee. 141
Turning to Lane’s speech, the Court first determined that Lane spoke
as a citizen on a matter of public concern. 142 The Court explained, “Truth-
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Id.
Id. at 2379.
Id. The Court noted that perjury is a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1623.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2380.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his
ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.” 143
The Court noted that “[s]worn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen” because “anyone who testifies in
court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the
truth.” 144 This obligation is independent of any obligations the employee
may have to the government as its employer. 145
The Court then explained how the Eleventh Circuit read Garcetti far
too broadly. 146 The Court specifically rejected the notion that an employee
is speaking pursuant to official job duties merely because the speech relates
to information learned through the course of his employment. 147 Instead,
the critical question is “whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those
duties.” 148 By using the language “ordinary job duties,” the Court narrowed
and clarified Garcetti’s holding insofar as it rejected an expansive interpretation of the language “pursuant to official job duties.” Additionally, the
Court noted that under the Eleventh Circuit’s reading of Garcetti, public
employees would be placed in a difficult situation when they learned of
public corruption, because that information would necessarily be learned
through their employment. 149 As such, the employee would be torn between obligations to its employer and its obligation to testify truthfully. 150
The Court then held that the content, form, and context all pointed towards a finding that Lane’s speech was on a matter of public concern. 151
The content of the speech—government corruption—was a matter of “significant public concern.” 152 Additionally, the form and context of the
speech cemented the conclusion that it was on a matter of public concern
because “testimony under oath has the formality and gravity necessary to
remind the witness that his or her statements will be the basis for official
government action . . . .” 153 The Court then balanced the employee’s interest against that of the government’s and found that the scale weighed

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 149 Side A

05/10/2016 13:13:34

13 DELONEY FINAL DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

PROTECTING TRIAL TESTIMONY

4/14/2016 8:19 PM

725

heavily in favor of Lane. 154 There was no evidence that the speech was
neither false nor erroneous nor did it unnecessarily disclose privileged information. 155 Moreover, it did not undermine efficiency of services or office relationships.156 Thus, the Court found that Lane’s testimony was
protected. 157
II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Id. at 2381.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568
Id. at 568; Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418–19.
E.g., Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.
E.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
E.g., id.
E.g., id.
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154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
(1968).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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Several important principles emerge from the cases discussed above.
First, the principal task for courts is to balance the government’s interests
as an employer and the employee’s interests as a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern. 158 This balancing is rooted in the need for government efficiency in providing public services, which would be compromised
if every employment decision turned into a constitutional claim. 159 However, the Pickering balancing test seeks to reconcile that with the fact that
public employees occupy a unique role in society. Public employees are
often in the best position to expose government corruption and comment on
matters concerning the public. 160 Because of the public employee’s unique
role, the employee’s interests in speaking as a citizen are tied to the public’s interest in remaining informed as to the integrity of government operations. 161
In order to guide this analysis, courts, as a threshold matter, must examine whether the speech was made as a citizen speaking on a matter of
public concern or as an employee. 162 If the person was speaking as a citizen
on a matter of public concern, then the possibility of a First Amendment
claim arises. 163 Conversely, if the speech is made purely in the capacity as
an employee, then the employee has no First Amendment claim based on
the government’s reaction to the speech.164 To distinguish between citizen
speech and employee speech, courts should look to whether the speech was
made pursuant to the employee’s ordinary duties, meaning, more or less,
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what the employee does on a day-to-day basis or as required by their ordinary job duties. 165 The mere fact that an employee learns of information
through his or her employment does not automatically render the speech at
issue “employee speech.” 166 But speech which subject matter is derived
from or related to the individual’s role as a public employee is to be distinguished from speech that owes its existence to the person’s ordinary, professional job responsibilities.167 Furthermore, an employee’s job
description is not conclusive evidence to show that the employee was acting as an employee. 168 Instead, the inquiry is a practical one, suggesting
that the employee’s actual day-to-day activities or ordinary activities must
be examined for a proper analysis of the case. 169
The next question becomes whether the speech was on a matter of
public concern. Generally, matters of public concern consist of “any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community.” 170 This inquiry is
guided by the content, form, and context of the speech at issue. 171 If the
court concludes that the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public
concern, the issue turns to whether the government had “an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the
general public.” 172 The government’s burden in justifying the action taken
against the employee varies with how substantially the employee’s speech
involves matters of public concern. 173 Thus, if the employee speech indisputably relates to a matter of public concern, then “a stronger showing [of
government interests] may be necessary.” 174 On the other hand, if the citizen speech only minutely touches on a matter of public concern, then the
government will have less of a burden in justifying its actions.175 If the
government cannot adequately justify its employment action taken against
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 149 Side B
05/10/2016 13:13:34

165. Compare id. at 421 (holding the First Amendment does not protect speech by public employees made “pursuant to their official duties”) (emphasis added), with Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378 (holding
the First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech made “outside the scope of his ordinary job
responsibilities”) (emphasis added).
166. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
167. Id.
168. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25.
169. See id.
170. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
171. Id. at 147–48.
172. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High School Dist. 205,
Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
173. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
174. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (2014) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 152).
175. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151–52.
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the employee for his or her speech, then there has been an unconstitutional
infringement on that employee’s First Amendment rights. 176
III. REILLY, CHRZANWSKI, AND TRIAL TESTIMONY

A. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City
Six years prior to Lane, the Third Circuit took up Reilly v. City of Atlantic City. There, Reilly, an Atlantic City police officer, assisted a state
investigation into corruption among the Atlantic City police department.177
Reilly testified in a criminal case against a fellow officer. 178 Several officers harbored animosity towards Reilly for his participation in the trial. 179
Years later, Reilly was charged with creating a hostile work environment

05/10/2016 13:13:34

176. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380–81.
177. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2008).
178. Id. at 220.
179. Id. at 261.
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The Third Circuit’s decision in Reilly v. City of Atlantic City and the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Chrzanwski v. Bianchi are instructive and
persuasive cases illustrating the need to provide special protections to compelled trial testimony made during the course of a public employee’s ordinary duties. In both cases, the court recognized the dual role a public
employee occupies when providing sworn testimony—a sentiment that the
Supreme Court later reiterated in Lane. And a critical aspect to both Reilly
and Chrzanowski was that the speech was made under oath during either a
trial or grand jury proceeding, thereby transforming the public employee’s
speech from merely employee speech to citizen speech. In reaching their
conclusions, both courts carefully scrutinized Garcetti, and found that its
categorical bar to claims made pursuant to an employee’s job duties did not
apply to public employees’ trial testimony made pursuant to their professional responsibilities.
These cases help to demonstrate that a per se rule characterizing trial
testimony made during the course of an employee’s ordinary job duties as
“citizen speech on a matter of public concern” and existing doctrine surrounding public employee First Amendment rights are not in tension.
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court specifically passing on the issue
addressed in Chrzanwski and Reilly, Lane does indeed echo principles articulated in those cases, underscoring the conclusion that public employee
trial testimony made during the course of ordinary job responsibilities deserves First Amendment coverage.
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180. Id.
181. Id. at 219. Reilly contended his supervisor’s promotion was the first opportunity for him to
take action against Reilly for his testimony. Id. at 221. In the years preceding Reilly’s disciplinary
charge, Reilly’s mentor, who was also involved in the criminal trial, was still in the department. Id. at
220–21. Reilly alleged that after his mentor was promoted to chief-of-police and was no longer in the
department, his supervisor began to demean him in front of other officers. Id.
182. Id. at 231.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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and engaging in inappropriate conduct towards a subordinate. 180 After an
extensive hearing was held, an independent hearing officer concluded that
only a four-day suspension was appropriate due to mitigating circumstances.
Despite the independent hearing officer’s conclusion, Reilly’s supervisor—a friend of the officer against whom Reilly testified—recommended
that Reilly be demoted in rank with a 90-day suspension or retire as sergeant immediately. Reilly retired. He then filed suit against his supervisor
and the police department, alleging that he was forced to retire not because
of his most recent disciplinary action, but because he exercised his First
Amendment rights by testifying in his fellow officer’s criminal trial years
earlier. 181 The city, on the other hand, argued that his speech was made
pursuant to his official duties, and therefore not constitutionally protected.
Affirming the district court, the court held that Reilly’s truthful trial testimony made pursuant to his official responsibilities deserved First Amendment coverage. 182
In coming to this conclusion, the court noted that Reilly’s testimony
appeared to have stemmed from his official duties in the investigation.
However, the court reasoned that Garcetti offered no express instruction on
the First Amendment’s application to a public employee’s trial testimony
that arises out of his or her job duties.183 Thus, relying on well-settled law
that dictates every citizen must provide testimony if compelled, the court
determined that Reilly was indeed acting as a citizen when he testified at
trial and not “simply performing his or her job duties.” 184 Rather, Reilly
was “acting as a citizen and is bound by the dictates of the court and the
rules of evidence,” and “the First Amendment protection associated with
fulfilling that duty of citizenship is not vitiated by one’s status as public
employee.” 185 Moreover, the court concluded that protecting truthful testimony “promotes the ‘individual and societal interests’ served when citizens
play their vital role in the judicial process.” 186
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B. Chrzanowski v. Bianchi
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187. Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734, 742 (7th Cir. 2013).
188. Id. at 736.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 739–40. That sentiment was later echoed in Lane when the Court explained, “the mere
fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public employment does not
transform that speech into employee—rather than citizen—speech.” Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369,
2379 (2014). The central focus of the inquiry should be on whether the speech was part of the employee’s ordinary job responsibilities. In other words, subject matter is not the dispositive factor in characterizing speech as either citizen or employee.
192. Chrzanowski, 725 F.3d at 741.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22).
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In Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, the Seventh Circuit addressed a similar issue to that in Reilly, and concluded that the First Amendment protects
truthful, subpoenaed, trial testimony. 187 In that case, Chrzanowski was an
Assistant State’s Attorney. 188 In connection with a criminal investigation
against the State’s Attorney, Chrzanowski testified during a grand jury
proceeding and the prosecutor’s case-in-chief. 189 Allegedly, as a result of
testifying against his supervisor, Chrzanowski’s employment with the
State’s Attorney was terminated. Chrzanowski brought suit, alleging that
his First Amendment rights had been violated. 190
Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that the First
Amendment protected the plaintiff’s speech for two reasons. First, the court
reasoned that Garcetti did not bar the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim
because testifying before a grand jury was not part of the plaintiff’s ordinary daily activities as a State’s Attorney. The court chided the district
court for concluding the testimony was made pursuant to his official duties
solely because the subject matter of his testimony related to his job as a
State’s Attorney. 191
But more importantly, the court explained that even if testifying was
part of the State’s Attorney’s ordinary job responsibilities, he spoke as a
citizen on a matter of public concern when testifying before the grand jury. 192 In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the reasoning underpinning Garcetti’s categorical bar to First Amendment claims based on
speech made “pursuant to official duties” inapplicable to cases involving
subpoenaed grand jury or trial testimony. 193
According to the court, Garcetti did not protect speech made pursuant
to official duties because such speech is of a different character than citizen
speech. First, “restrictions on [employee] speech ‘do not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.’” 194 Second,
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“restrictions on [employee] speech in no way undermine the potential societal value . . . [because] employees ‘retain the prospect of constitutional
protection for their contributions to the civic discourse.’”195 Lastly, “a contrary approach . . . would ‘commit state and federal courts to . . . [an] intrusive role, mandating oversight of communications between . . . employees
and their supervisors during the course of official business,’ and would
‘displace managerial discretion.’” 196 Taking each justification underlying
Garcetti in turn, the court determined each to be inapplicable.
First, the Chrzanowski court found that the individual has a strong interest in complying with the demands of a subpoena because failure to do
so can result in incarceration. 197 Next, unlike typical speech made pursuant
to official duties, the public has a strong interest in hearing truthful testimony from government employees because such speech “often provides
society with information that is essential for democratic selfgovernance.” 198 Moreover, threats against or punishment of retaliation for
subpoenaed testimony would chill the employee’s contributions to the civic
discourse. 199 Finally, Garcetti’s hesitation about courts interfering with the
government’s managerial discretion is of little consequence in cases of
speech made pursuant to a subpoena because there is hardly any legitimate
managerial interest in dissuading an employee from testifying when compelled to testify by subpoena. Consequently, this led the court to hold that
subpoenaed trial testimony constituted citizen speech.200
C. Trial Testimony Is Citizen Speech

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 742.
Id.
Id.
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195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
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Although decided without the guidance of Lane, both Reilly and
Chrzanowski illustrate the need to characterize trial testimony as citizen
speech, even if such speech arises during the course of a public employee’s
ordinary duties. As the Chrzanowski court noted, the underlying justifications for not affording speech made in the course of an employee’s ordinary job duties is misplaced when applied to truthful testimony conducted
during judicial proceedings.
First and foremost, not affording truthful trial testimony protection
undermines the integrity of the judicial system. As the Chrzanowski court
recognized, truthful testimony “is necessary to protect the integrity of the
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201. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).
202. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (“Such a rule would place public employees . . .
in an impossible position, torn between the obligation to testify truthfully and the desire to avoid retaliation and keep their jobs.”).
203. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231.
204. ACLU Brief, supra note 16, at 10.

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 152 Side A

judicial process and to insulate that process from outside pressure.” 201 It
stands to reason that allowing the government to act uninhibited in its reaction to an employee’s truthful trial testimony places an undue influence on
the employee. Employees are either, depending on the demands of the employer, potentially left to commit perjury, remain mute and be held in contempt, or tell the truth and face their government employer’s retaliation.
The Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in Lane and noted that an employee would be placed in a compromising position if torn between loyalty
to his employer or the truth. 202 Considering the great emphasis courts have
placed on the importance of truthful trial testimony to the integrity of the
judicial system, 203 allowing the government to take an adverse employment
action against an employee for his or her truthful testimony, although part
of his or her daily duties, is inconsistent with the notion that the judicial
system acts as society’s truth seeking institution.
Protecting truthful trial testimony because it was made outside of an
employee’s ordinary job duties, rather than during the course of such duties, is a flawed distinction. The fact-finding function of trials is undermined no less because persons providing false or misleading testimony are
public servants acting in the course of their ordinary job duties rather than
outside the scope of their daily responsibilities. Moreover, the public has an
especially significant interest in ensuring that persons who regularly testify
as a part of their ordinary public duties are protected from adverse employment action, because they are more likely to be influential on jurors
and others. 204
Additionally, characterizing trial testimony made during an employee’s ordinary job duties as employee speech rather than citizen speech ignores the dual roles and independent obligations the person taking the stand
bears. As Lane, Reilly, and Chrzanowski make clear, a government employee is not simply an employee when providing trial testimony. Instead,
the employee acts as a citizen because of the liberty interest at stake once
he or she takes the stand. The Supreme Court and many lower courts have
reiterated that it is incumbent on a witness to testify truthfully and aid in
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205. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (“Sworn judicial testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential
example of speech as a citizen for a simple reason: Anyone who testified in court bears an obligation, to
the court and society at large, to tell the truth.”).
206. See supra Part III.B.
207. Testimony, whether voluntary or compelled, should be protected. Truthful testimony aids in
the judicial process and serves the public good regardless of the method by which it was obtained.
ACLU Brief, supra note 16, at 11. Whether the testimony was voluntary or compelled does not bear on
the employee’s role as a citizen when testifying. Id. at 12–13. Moreover, in both the civil and criminal
context, many witnesses are compelled by subpoena arbitrarily. Attorneys “issue subpoenas to witnesses who would have voluntarily attended even absent a subpoena.” Id. at 13. Thus, regardless of whether
the testimony was procured by subpoena or voluntarily, when an employee testifies at trial, that speech
should be characterized as “citizen speech” and a matter of “public concern.”

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 152 Side B

the judicial process. 205 This duty is not lost simply by the nature of one’s
employment; nor are persons shielded from perjury prosecution as result of
providing false testimony simply because of their employment status. By
divorcing the concurrent roles people play—as citizens and employees—
while testifying, employees are left in a severely vulnerable position.
Although under the proposed rule, trial testimony would be considered
per se citizen speech, the government is not left without protections. As the
Court noted in Lane, employees taking the stand are not free from all obligations to the government as their employer. The employee could possibly
be reprimanded for disclosing privileged or confidential information. But
these concerns need not be addressed when determining whether the person
taking the stand spoke as an employee or citizen. Instead, that inquiry
should be saved for a Pickering analysis, which affords the government
with an opportunity to offer a legitimate reason for taking its actions.
Finally, truthful trial testimony should be considered “citizen speech”
regardless of whether it was part of the employee’s ordinary duties because
the justifications for leaving employee speech unprotected are not applicable to trial testimony. Although the Court in Lane did clarify the scope of
Garcetti’s “pursuant to official job duties” language, the Court did not call
into question the underlying justifications of Garcetti’s categorical bar to
such claims. Instead, it merely clarified that speech which subject matter
stems from one’s employment does not automatically qualify as employee
speech. Thus, although the court squarely rejected an excessively broad
reading of “pursuant to official duties,” Chrzanowski still provides forceful
arguments demonstrating the inapplicability of Garcetti’s theoretical underpinnings when applied to trial testimony. 206 Although Chrzanowski
arises out of the context of a subpoena, its reasoning also applies even if the
testimony is voluntary. 207
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208. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
209. Id. at 147–48.
210. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012).
211. Several circuit courts have held that trial or grand jury testimony is always a matter of public
concern. See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir 2008) (holding that “trial testimony is offered ‘in a context that is inherently of public concern.’”); Johnston v. Harris Cty. Flood
Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[w]hen an employee testifies before
an official government adjudicatory or fact-finding body he speaks in a context that is in inherently of
public concern.”).
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The Supreme Court has held that speech touches on a matter of public
concern when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.” 208 To guide analysis of
whether the speech in question touches on a matter of public concern,
courts examine the “content,” “form,” and “context” of the speech.209 For
many of the same reasons why trial testimony should always be considered
“citizen speech,” trial testimony always meets the “public concern” requirement.
The “form” and “context” in which trial testimony takes place is
enough to elevate the speech to a matter of public concern. The speech is
made orally under oath (form) and during a judicial proceeding (context).
These factors weigh heavily towards categorically recognizing trial testimony as a matter of public concern. As the Supreme Court has noted, “unlike speech in other contexts, testimony under oath has the formality and
gravity necessary to remind the witness that his or her statements will be
the basis for official governmental action, action that often affects the
rights and liberties of others.” 210
There should be no inquiry into the content of the employee’s speech
in determining whether it touches on a matter of public concern because the
context and form in which sworn judicial statements occur make it a matter
of public concern. 211 A witness should be able to speak freely and truthfully
without fear of reprisal. When aiding in the judicial process, a foundation
of self-government, employee speech should always be protected regardless of the content. The content of the speech will eventually be scrutinized
under a Pickering analysis. At that time, the content of the speech must
necessarily be weighed as a factor in determining whether the government
had a sufficient reason to justify its response to the testimony. A rule
providing that trial testimony constituted a per se matter of public concern—even if made during the course of a public employee’s ordinary duties—would still leave the government in a position to exercise a
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significant degree of managerial discretion in response to its employee’s
speech.
Some concern can be expressed over whether the government would
ever prevail under the Pickering analysis, and whether lower courts would
provide cursory reasoning when the speech at issue was truthful testimony.
Indeed, in adopting a bright line rule providing First Amendment coverage
to trial testimony, it may be possible that the government will have a difficult time prevailing under a Pickering analysis. But if the government’s
only justification for taking action against that employee is because of the
truthful content of the employee speech, then the employee’s interest, and
the public’s interest in hearing such speech, should place a significant obstacle for the government to overcome in justifying why it took adverse
action against the employee.
That is not to say that there will never be instances where the government is permitted to take action against employees for their trial testimony.
Testimony that is later revealed to be false would provide the government
with a lawful basis for terminating the employee or taking other adverse
action. If an employee discloses confidential information, although truthful,
the government could take action without violating that employee’s First
Amendment rights. In a similar vein, should an employee reveal his or her
own misconduct or some other information while testifying that would
warrant disciplinary action, the government would be able to take employment action. In such an event, the misconduct revealed as a result of the
testimony would provide a lawful basis for taking disciplinary action, not
the testimony that revealed the misconduct or incompetence. Moreover, as
Pickering instructs, the burden on the government in justifying its actions
will vary depending on the extent to which the employee speaks to matters
of public concern. Accordingly, when speech touches on a matter of public
concern solely because it is trial testimony, and the content of the testimony
is not of significant public interest, the government will have a lowered
burden in justifying its actions.
In essence, this rule attempts to provide a framework that affords a
court the flexibility necessary to balance the competing interests on a caseby-case basis without Garcetti’s rigidity, which has caused some questionable outcomes. By categorically extending First Amendment coverage to
trial testimony, the employee is able to speak freely and without fear of
reprisals from their employer. On the other hand, the government still is
afforded an opportunity to offer legitimate reasons for treating the employee differently than that of an ordinary citizen under a Pickering analysis.
Such a system would ensure that the government’s managerial discretion
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and interest in maintaining efficiency is preserved, while simultaneously
safeguarding that the employee’s First Amendment rights are not unconstitutionally violated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Public employees’ First Amendment rights to speak freely and truthfully before a tribunal should not be dependent on whether the speech is
made pursuant to their ordinary duties. As discussed above, providing special protections to trial testimony is necessary to protect judicial integrity
and ensure that employees are not placed under an undue burden when
taking the stand. Withholding First Amendment protection based on
whether the speech was in the course of one’s ordinary job duties is a distinction that does not stand up to scrutiny when applied to trial testimony.
Consequently, courts should deem an employee a “citizen” speaking to a
“matter of public concern” when he or she is testifying truthfully during a
court proceeding regardless of whether it was part of his or her ordinary job
duties.
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